Risk Sharing and Procedures manual in Cameroonian Small Businesses: Case of Automobile Garages

International Journal of Economics and Management Studies

© 2021 by SSRG - IJEMS Journal

Volume 8 Issue 10

Year of Publication : 2021

Authors : Book Nyobe Aurélien Bertrand

10.14445/23939125/IJEMS-V8I10P119

How to Cite?

Book Nyobe Aurélien Bertrand, "Risk Sharing and Procedures manual in Cameroonian Small Businesses: Case of Automobile Garages," SSRG International Journal of Economics and Management Studies, vol. 8,  no. 10, pp. 146-152, 2021. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.14445/23939125/IJEMS-V8I10P119

Abstract:

The objective of our study is to improve the financial performance of automobile garages through risk-sharing between garage owners and their managers. This risk-sharing is explained by the Agency Theory. The results obtained from a sample of 73 automobile garages, from 2011 to 2020, and with the use of a qualitative approach based on a binary scoring grid revealed that the total or partial implementation of the sales cycles and payment of services in the procedure manuals increases or decreases the earnings of owners (principal) and managers (agent). Therefore, the risk-sharing mechanisms could be perceived at two levels: a guaranteed guarantee on indebtedness with creditors and a risk premium for managers on compliance with the procedure manuals.

Keywords:

Information asymmetry, Incentives, Procedure manuals, Control mechanisms, Risk-sharing.

References:

[1] Amichia k, Evaluation des procedures des terres-pleins banalisés de la division exploitation des installations terrestres: Cas du port autonome de Dakar, Cesag, Dakar, (2004),
[2] Akerlof G, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (84)3, (1970), 488-500.
[3] Bardin L, L’analyse du conténu, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, (1998).
[4] Bidiasse H, La theorie de l’agence et la concession des services publics: le cas des chemins de fer camerounais, Revue mondes en developpement, 177, (2017), 121-137.
[5] Calorie R, Johnson G, Sarnin P, CEO’S, Cognitive maps and the scope of the Organization, Strategic Management Journal, 15, (1994), 437-457.
[6] Charreaux G, Le dilemme des PME: Ouvrir son capital ou s’endetter?. Revue Francaise de Gestion, n°50, (1985), 59-72.
[7] Charreaux G, Conseil d’Administration et pouvoir de l’entreprise, Revue d’Economie Financière, 31, (1994).
[8] Collerette P, Schneider R, Legris P, Managing Organizationnel Change Part One Change in turbulent times. ISO Management Systèms, www.iso.org/ims, (2001).
[9] Curien N, Economie des réseaux, Paris, La Decouverte, (2005).
[10] Fama E, Agency Problèm and The Théory of the Firm, The Journal of The Political Economy 88 (2), (1980), 288-307.
[11] Fama E, Jensen M, Séparation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), (1983), 301-325.
[12] Gadrey J, La modernisation des services professionnel. Rationalisation industrielle ou rationalisation professionnelle? Revue francaise de sociologie, (35) 2, (1994b), 163-195.
[13] Gusagis K. N, Hadri M, The Influence of the Implementation of Good Corporate Governance on the Level of Disclosure of Sustainability Reporting with Financial Performance as an Intervening Variable, International Journal of Economics and
Management Studies, 8(9), 2021, 22-28, https://doi:10.14445/23939125/IJEMS-V8I9P103
[14] Grossman J, Hart O, An analysis of The Principal-Agent Problèm, Econométrica, 51(1), (1983), 7-45.
[15] Henry A, Monkam-Daverat I, Rédiger les procedures de l’entreprise. Guide pratique. Edition d’Organisation, Paris, 3ème edition, (2005).
[16] Henry A, Monkam-Daverat I, Rédiger les procedures de l’entreprise. Guide pratique. Edition d’Organisation, Paris, (2002). 185
[17] Jensen M, Meckling W, Théory of de firm: Managérial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure », Journal of Financial Economics, 3, (1976), 305-360.
[18] Jensen M, Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, America Economics Review, 76, (1986), 323-329.
[19] Laffont J, Toward and Normative Théory of Incendie Contract Between Government and a private firm, The Economic Journal, 97, (1987), 17-31.
[20] Mishkin F, International Expérience With Différent Monetary Regimes. Journal of Monetary Economics, 43, (1999), 579-606.
[21] Norton E, Capital Structure and Small Public Firm, Journal of Business Venturing 6 (4), (1991), 287-295.
[22] Rochaix R, Asymmetries d’information et incertitude de santé: Les apports de la théorie des contrats, Economie et Prévision, 129-130, (1997), 11-24.
[23] Stiglitz J, Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, The Review of Economic Studies, 41(2), (1974)., 219-255.
[24] Stiglizt J, Weiss A, Crédit rationing in markets with imperfect information. The American Economic Review, 71 (3), (1981), 91-410.
[25] Selvi, Lanto Miriatin Amali, Abdul Wahab Tunus, Intan Pakaya, The Influence of Good Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, Company Size on Market Reactions in Manufacturing Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, International Journal of Economics and Management Studies, 8(10), 2021, 98-106, https://doi:10.14445/23939125/IJEMS-V8I10P113.
[26] Sow N, Codex: Audit interne et procedures, Cesag, Dakar, (2004).
[27] Yin R, Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing, (1994).