R&D Outsourcing Contract Stimulates the Efforts of Sharing Implicit and Explicit Knowledge

International Journal of Mechanical Engineering

© 2016 by SSRG - IJME Journal

Volume 3 Issue 3

Year of Publication : 2016

Authors : T. Gnanasekaran

10.14445/23488360/IJME-V3I3P104

How to Cite?

T. Gnanasekaran, "R&D Outsourcing Contract Stimulates the Efforts of Sharing Implicit and Explicit Knowledge," SSRG International Journal of Mechanical Engineering, vol. 3,  no. 3, pp. 11-14, 2016. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.14445/23488360/IJME-V3I3P104

Abstract:

The main aim of this article is to support a R&D outsourcing contract designoutline to incent R&D outsourcing provision of distribute implicit and explicit knowledge. The principal-agent theory to formsmultitask principal-agent model which focuses on dual cases. First one is that the effort costs of explicit and implicit knowledge sharing are complementary, while another is the effort costs are identical.When the costs of explicit and implicit knowledge sharing are complementary, theconsumer can increase the enticement coefficient of explicit knowledge sharing to motivateimplicit knowledge sharing. This motivation process not only stimulates implicit information sharing, but also stimulates the effort levels of explicit knowledge sharing. Furthermore, the multitask R&D outsourcing deal can motivate the effort of explicit knowledge sharing to attain system optimization, but it fails to motivate the effort of implicit knowledge sharing to accomplish system optimization. The paper encompasses prior literature by scheming multitask R&D outsourcingcontract in order to share the implicit knowledge. Here not only consider the cost of switch the relationship between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge, but also study the cost of complementary relationship. Research limitations:In this paper consider only the outsourcingrelationship is short-range, so the multitask R&D outsourcing deal is formal. In fact, the outsourcing relationship might be long-term, and the multitask R&D outsourcing contract will be informal.

Keywords:

R&D outsourcing, knowledge sharing, implicit knowledge value, explicit Knowledge value, principal-agent, incentive contract

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